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Abstract:
The market implied volatilities for target stocks during the period between an acquisition announcement
and the transaction resolution were examined for differences between samples of successful and failed
transactions. By constructing volatility ratios for all cash and pure stock swap transactions, I find that
market implied volatilities for successful and failed transactions diverge over time for cash bids but not
stock bids.
Introduction:
Risk arbitrage, also known as merger arbitrage, is part of a broader category of investment strategies
aimed at generating returns from event risk as opposed to market risk. Made famous by Ivan Boesky, the
1980s king of the arbitrageurs, and his large team of traders, lawyers, and informants, this traditional
strategy is still pursued by hundreds of hedge funds, attempting to make bets on the success or failure of
an announced transaction (Russell, 1986). In risk arbitrage situations, investors, primarily hedge funds
and institutions, attempt to profit from the spread between the anticipated purchase price and current
trading price of the target company in an acquisition or merger scenario. In cash bids, the arbitrageur will
try to profit by owning the stock of the target firm, which generally trades lower than the agreed upon
acquisition price in the absence of competing bids. In stock swaps, the arbitrageur will generally buy
stock in the target firm and short stock in the acquiring firm in a ratio corresponding to the exchange ratio
enumerated in the merger agreement. At the completion of the transaction, the arbitrageur receives shares
in the acquirer firm which is then used to settle the short side of the trade. The returns from risk arbitrage,
however, are often asymmetrical. Empirically, small gains are realized from completed mergers but large
losses accumulate from withdrawn transactions because the target firm’s stock price returns to a level
which no longer incorporates the control premium inherent in the bid price (Branch & Yang, 2006). In
this paper, I aim to examine the differences in options implied volatilities between successful (completed)
and failed (withdrawn) takeover attempts and utilize these implied volatilities to understand how markets
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reflect potential success or failure. Results surrounding these implied volatilities may be useful in
predicting the outcome of transactions for risk arbitrageurs.
Option Mechanics in Merger Situations:
Before discussing the previous literature, it is useful to explore the effect of successful merger
transactions on the legal delivery obligations of target firm options contracts as set by the Options
Clearing Corporation. At the close of an all cash transaction, the rules stipulate that the options contract
will be cash settled in the amount of the acquisition share price times the number of shares in the contract,
usually 100 (Options Clearing Corporation, 2009). As of January 2, 2008, the Options Cleaning
Corporation made exercising the target company’s options in an all cash transaction at the date of deal
closure mandatory. Because it would have been ideal to exercise early on the date of closure rather than
wait until expiration, this new rule is merely procedural and has no material effect on the economics of
the contract. For all stock transactions, option contracts expiring after the close of the transaction are
adjusted by the transaction exchange ratio to deliver the acquirer firm’s stock in lieu of the target firm’s
stock. Fractional shares are cash settled (Options Clearing Corporation, 2009). In a mixed transaction,
the cash settlement and stock conversion portions are prorated according to the merger agreement. In
some cases, the target company shareholders are given the choice of cash or stock, up to a fixed
proportion determined by the acquiring company. In these cases, the options holder receives a proration
based on the non-electing shareholders’ consideration1 (Options Clearing Corporation, 2009).
In order to reduce the complexity involving different forms of transactions and their effects on options
settlement, I choose here to focus on two types of transactions, the all cash and the all stock transaction.

1

This scenario occurs when shareholders are given the choice between receiving all cash or all stock in a mixed
consideration transaction and the company has set a fixed percentage to be distributed in cash and stock. Nonelecting shareholders are shareholders who do not specify their preference. Those who specify their preferences are
given priority, and non-electing shareholders receive a proration of the remaining consideration such that the
company achieves its previously determined cash and stock payout percentages.
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Previous Literature:
With the rise in popularity of merger arbitrage in the 1980s, academics began to analyze the information
contained in stock and options markets during merger situations. However, the majority of the options
research has focused on the time period surrounding the initial bid announcement, particularly with
regards to informed trading, rumors, and information leakage. Jayaraman, Frye, and Sabherwal (2001)
conclude that call and put option volume and open interest increase prior to transaction announcements,
which is followed by unusual activity in the equity markets. Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2005) find that
before a bid announcement there is an increase in call option volume imbalances, i.e. purchases initiated
by call buyers. They also find a strong correlation between the imbalance in call volume and the bid
premium. Comparing these results to the equity markets, they conclude that the options market provides
a better signaling mechanism in takeover scenarios. Levy and Yoder (1993) and Jayaraman, Mandelker,
and Shastri (1991) conclude that target firm implied volatilities increase significantly in advance of a
transaction announcement and decline after that announcement.
Analyses around the bid period, the interval between the transaction announcement and resolution, have
generally been more limited in scope. Studying equity prices, Brown and Raymond (1986) utilize
expectation calculations to determine the market implied probability of success or failure, showing that
the market differentiates between successful and failed transactions. Hutson (2000) expands on this work
by looking at standardized prices2 as opposed to probabilities and finds that Australian stock prices do not
fully converge to the offer price due to lower liquidity and stale last trade prices. Hutson and Kearney
(2001) show declines in bid period conditional and unconditional volatility of target companies’ stock
prices. They find that post-bid betas are much lower than pre-bid betas for cash transactions and that
unconditional and conditional price volatility declines most drastically for cash bids and less so for stock

Standardized share price on day d of the bid period, denoted 𝑥𝑑 , is defined as 𝑥𝑑 = (𝑃𝑑 − 𝑃𝐼 )/(𝑃𝑇 − 𝑃𝐼 ), where 𝑃𝑑
is the actual stock price on day d, 𝑃𝑇 is the bid price, and 𝑃𝐼 is the price 1 month prior to the bid announcement.
2
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swap offers. Price volatility declines are also statistically significant for successful bids and insignificant
for unsuccessful bids.
Turning to the options market, Barone-Adesi, Brown, and Harlow (1994) conclude that options implied
volatilities in all cash transactions reflect information regarding the outcome of the transaction. Using
call options at the same strike and different maturities, they show that implied volatilities of options
expiring after the proposed transaction completion date are lower than implied volatilities of options
expiring before the proposed date reflecting the accelerated maturity of the long dated option upon deal
closure. They also see in their data that this effect is much more pronounced in successful offers versus
failed offers. Subramanian (2004) develops an arbitrage-free model for pricing options of target firms in
stock swap transactions by incorporating jump diffusions for the possibility of transaction withdrawals.
Subramanian also empirically confirms the assumption that the price volatilities of target and acquirer
stocks converge for stock swaps, and further develops a measure of success probability based on his
model. Hutson and Kearney (2005) similarly find significant interaction between target and acquirer
stock prices in stock swap transactions.
Hypothesis Development:
While Barone-Adesi, Brown, and Harlow (1994) focus on acceleration of options maturities and their
effects on implied volatilities for all cash transactions, I analyze implied volatility from a different
perspective. Hutson and Kearney (2001) show that unconditional price volatilities decline for target
companies during the bid period. Hutson and Kearney (2001) attribute the price volatility declines to a
converging of market expectations or as they put it: “the reduction in price volatility can be explained by
a reduction in the dispersion of traders’ beliefs regarding value, as it becomes apparent that the takeover
will succeed.” I predict that this ex-post analysis of declines in price volatility should be manifested in
forward indicators as well. Thus implied volatilities, a market driven indicator of future volatility, should
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decrease. These implied volatilities should also reflect the probability of bid success or failure as
perceived by the market.
To test this outcome on all cash transactions, I utilize a normalized volatility ratio for the target company,
𝜎𝑇
𝜎𝐹

where 𝜎𝑇 is the implied volatility of the target’s option at a point in time during the bid period and

𝜎𝐹 is the implied volatility of a target’s option in the absence of the transaction, denoted as the fallback
volatility. Thus the expectation for successful cash transactions is that implied volatilities should
converge to zero, meaning

𝜎𝑇
𝜎𝐹

→ 0. For failed cash transactions, the target’s implied volatility should

revert back to 𝜎𝐹 as the normal price determining processes return and dispersion in traders’ beliefs about
the outcomes again manifest themselves in the options price. Thus

𝜎𝑇
𝜎𝐹

→ 1 for failed transactions.

For pure stock-swap transactions, a different outcome should be expected. Subramanian (2004)’s
conclusion that the price volatilities of the target and acquirer show high correlation and Hutson and
Kearney (2005)’s conclusion that there is significant interaction in target and bidder stock prices during
the bid period for all stock transactions confirm that the price formation process changes in stock-swap
transactions. If correlations in stock prices are high and options of the target firm are merely converted to
options on the acquirer’s stock in completed transactions, similar trends should manifest themselves in the
implied volatilities of the two companies’ options. Thus, 𝜎𝑇 should converge to 𝜎𝐴 , the implied volatility
of the acquirer’s stock, for a successful transaction, and 𝜎𝑇 should converge to 𝜎𝐹 for a failed transaction.
Here, I test a few ratio constructions. First, I expect to see

𝜎𝑇
𝜎𝐴

→ 1 for successful transactions and

𝜎𝑇
𝜎𝐴

≠1

for failed transactions. Second, to magnify the effect of the differences between target and acquirer
implied volatilities, I construct the ratio

𝜎𝑇 −𝜎𝐴
𝜎𝐴

which also has the benefit of being directionally

indifferent to the target implied volatility being higher or lower than the acquirer implied volatility. I
expect this ratio to trend to zero for successful transactions and some number different from zero for
failed transactions.
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Data:
Transactions data was collected from Thomson ONE Banker Deal Module, including announcement date,
completion date, withdrawal date, and terms of the merger. Deals had to have been announced between
January 1, 2003 and August 1, 2008 and resolved (either completed or withdrawn) by August 1, 2008.
Eligible transactions were limited to only those in which the targets were publicly listed companies in the
U.S with over $100MM in equity value and where all of the outstanding common equity was acquired.
Complex transaction structures like collars and multiple tiered purchase agreements were excluded as
well. Multiple bids and private equity involvement were coded into the data, and multiple bid
transactions were consolidated into one entry, using the date of the first bid announcement as the start
date for the transaction. All other information was retained based on the values for the final successful or
failed bid.
The best bid and ask prices on close for options and final trade price for stocks were collected from
OptionsMetrics. Implied volatilities were taken from OptionsMetrics, which utilizes a proprietary
modification of the Cox-Ross-Rubenstein binomial tree model to account for discrete dividends. These
implied volatilities were calculated based on the midpoint between the best bid and ask prices on close.
In order to maintain consistency while maximizing the size of my transactions data set, I utilized the
implied volatilities from the front month contract (nearest to expiration) but with more than one week
remaining before expiration keeping only the values for the nearest in-the-money call and put options. To
be consistent with previous studies, fallback implied volatilities were taken to be the implied volatility of
the front month contract four weeks prior to the first bid announcement only in cases where that contract
had at least one week left until expiration. Otherwise, the implied volatility of the next month contract
was used. Furthermore, not all dates in the bid period had calculable implied volatilities, and so I utilized
the last available implied volatility as a substitute for that date. This generated some data problems that
will be discussed later.
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Transactions which did not have options data were removed. To evaluate target implied volatilities in
stock-swap agreements, acquirer implied volatilities were also needed so eligible stock-swap transactions
were further limited to those with U.S. publicly traded acquirer firms with options data.
Among all 1597 transactions in that time period, 437 of them were retained, of which 56 were all stock
transactions and 381 were all cash transactions. Among the 381 cash transactions, 346 were successes
and 35 were failures. 29 involved multiple bids and 132 involved private equity companies. The average
days to resolution for successes and failures from the announcement of the first bid were 88 and 102 days
respectively. Among the 56 stock-swap transactions, 46 were successes and 10 were failures. None
involved multiple bids and three involved private equity companies. The average days to resolution for
successes and failures among this subset were 108 and 132 days respectively.
In addition, the data was viewed using three time frames: days after announcement, days before resolution,
and standardized transaction length, the last of which was calculated by rescaling all transactions to a
constant 100 day period. The former two frames had data points drop out based on the actual length of
deal.
Results and Discussion:
Cash Bids:
The following two graphs (Fig. 1 and 2) display the median ratio
separately in the bid period.

𝜎𝑇
𝜎𝐹

for calls and puts for each day
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Fig. 1: Median volatility ratio 𝜎𝑇 /𝜎𝐹 for calls and puts separated by completed and withdrawn all cash transactions each day
after the transaction announcement. The volatility ratio is calculated as the current target implied volatility divided by the
fallback implied volatility taken 4 weeks prior to the transaction announcement. Transactions which were resolved within 100
days are included in the data and are removed from the median calculation the day after they were resolved.
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Days Before Resolution
Fig. 2: Median volatility ratio 𝜎𝑇 /𝜎𝐹 for calls and puts separated by completed and withdrawn all cash transactions each day
before resolution. The volatility ratio is calculated as the current target implied volatility divided by the fallback implied
volatility taken 4 weeks prior to the transaction announcement. Transactions which were resolved within 100 days are included
in the data and are introduced into the sample the day they were announced.

In the announcement time frame, the median ratio declines shortly after announcement, and it seems the
market is able to differentiate between successful (completed) and failed (withdrawn) transactions as the
resolution date nears. To test this, I utilize a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, consistent with the
methodology utilized by Barone-Adesi et al. (1994), by comparing the median value of the call volatility
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ratio for completed transactions versus withdrawn transactions in both weeks after announcement and
weeks before resolution time frames. The results are in Table 1. Data is computed when available at that
exact time point.

Median Ratio
Number of Observations
Completed Withdrawn Completed Withdrawn
91.10%
95.72%
346
35
59.83%
76.13%
345
35
59.66%
80.89%
345
32
59.75%
76.24%
346
31
58.52%
71.44%
347
31
56.74%
67.54%
344
31
59.55%
82.27%
322
30
58.29%
67.07%
301
30
58.77%
83.53%
281
29
61.79%
91.51%
265
27
61.35%
84.76%
243
27

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
-1

102.87%

99.82%

346

Weeks Before Resolution

Weeks After Announcement

Table 1: Median volatility ratio 𝜎𝑇 /𝜎𝐹 for all cash transactions and number of observations for each week after announcement
(left panel) and each week before resolution (right panel). Wicoxon Signed-Rank Test p-value displayed below. Note: Week 0
refers to the day of announcement.

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Median Ratio
Number of Observations
Completed Withdrawn Completed Withdrawn
51.33%
113.35%
345
35
51.49%
94.53%
346
35
55.73%
109.17%
345
32
57.50%
96.81%
346
31
58.96%
76.04%
346
30
58.68%
83.10%
343
31
57.46%
103.28%
333
29
65.24%
107.33%
306
29
63.25%
112.76%
287
30
62.56%
108.95%
271
28
57.64%
100.38%
244
27

35

Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
p<0.001

Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
p<0.001

Both tests show that the market effectively separates successful and failed transactions in the weeks after
announcement and preceding resolution. Furthermore, similar outcomes are seen on a standardized
transaction timescale in Fig. 3.
1.8
1.6
1.4
Ratio

1.2
1

Call Completed

0.8

Call Withdrawn

0.6

Put Completed

0.4

Put Withdrawn

0.2
0
0

20

40

60

80

100

Standardized 100 Day Transaction Period
Fig. 3: Median volatility ratio 𝜎𝑇 /𝜎𝐹 for calls and puts separated by completed and withdrawn all cash transactions in a
standardized 100 day transaction period. The volatility ratio is calculated as the current target implied volatility divided by the
fallback implied volatility taken 4 weeks prior to the transaction announcement. Each target company’s bid period is scaled to
100 days and each data point is attributed to the nearest rescaled day. Data is included where available.
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When all transactions are rescaled to a standardized 100 day period, the data indicates a divergence
between the median ratios for successful and failed transactions. Ordinary least squares regression on the
standardized 100 day period data shows a statistically significant difference between the slopes of the
ratios for withdrawn and failed transactions over time. The equation used to model the regression is as
follows:
𝜎𝑇
= 𝛽1 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝐸
𝜎𝐹
+ 𝐶
The 𝛽2 term models the additional slope for failed transactions, where failure is an indicator variable with
value one for failed transactions and zero for completed transactions. In cases where there are multiple
bids or private equity involvement, Multiple Bids and PE are used respectively as indicator variables.
The results of the regression are listed in Table 2 with both regression coefficients calculated from call
and put data displayed separately.
Table 2: Regression coefficient estimates and p-values for separate call and put all cash transaction data on a standardized 100
day transaction period. The regression equation is 𝜎𝑇 /𝜎𝐹 = 𝛽1 (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽2 (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) +
𝛽3 (𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠) + 𝛽4 (𝑃𝐸) + 𝐶 where 𝜎𝑇 is the implied volatility on a particular day, 𝜎𝐹 is the fallback implied volatility
taken 4 weeks prior to the announcement date, time to resolution is the days after announcement in the standardized 100 day
transaction period, and failure, multiple bids, and PE (private equity) are indicator variables for those scenarios.

Call Data

Put Data

Description

Estimate

P-value

Estimate

P-value

C

Intercept

0.66618

<.0001

0.68040

<.0001

β1

Time to Resolution

0.0008633

<.0001

-0.0006614

<.0001

β2

Time to Resolution * Failure

0.0061368

<.0001

0.0095949

<.0001

β3

Multiple Bids (Y/N)

0.02800

<.0001

0.14709

.0173

β4

Private Equity Participation (Y/N)

0.10049

<.0001

0.07463

<.0001

The regression along a standardized 100 day time frame shows a very weak correlation, with an R2 value
of 0.0346 and 0.0871 for call and put data respectively. The slopes for both completed (𝛽1 ) and failed
(𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ) transactions are statistically significant. The regression data also shows statistically significant
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and rather large coefficients to the private equity term implying higher risks for private equity
transactions.
The magnitude of the slopes for completed and failed transactions is also quite different. For completed
transactions, the slope is approximately zero while the magnitude of the slopes for failed transactions is
positive, with the ratio increasing notionally by 0.9% and 0.7% for call and put implied volatilities
respectively for every incremental standardized day out of 100. Thus, at the end of the standardized time
period, call volatility ratios for failed transactions would be 0.9 higher than successful transactions. The
fact that the slope of successful transactions is not negative with any discernable magnitude may be due to
the use of last calculated implied volatilities in some instances. For completed transactions, as the
completion date approaches, some options do not have current period implied volatilities because the
midpoint of the options data is outside the allowable range. In these cases, I substitute the last calculated
implied volatility, leading to stale volatilities which may have artificially kept the median volatility ratio
higher. These stale volatilities may be due to decreased liquidity as the resolution date nears for
completed transactions. Empirically, Hutson (2000), studying Australian transaction data, notices a
reduction in liquidity as transactions approach completion. I find that this also occurs in my data set.
To analyze this, I first determined the normal options volume and open interest experienced in a particular
target stock in the absence of the deal by finding the average daily volume and average daily open interest
in the period four to eight weeks prior to the transaction announcement date, denoted as the fallback
volume and fallback open interest. I then total the option volume and open interest across all strikes for
each date and divide by its fallback counterpart to calculate the volume ratio and open interest ratio for
that day. Thus a volume ratio of 1 signifies a normal level of options volume. By dividing the bid period
into ten equal time segments, I standardize the time length of the transaction across all companies. I then
calculate the average volume and open interest ratio in each of the time segments to obtain Fig. 4.
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Median Open Interest Ratio Completed

1.5

Median Volume Ratio Withdrawn

1

Median Open Interest Ratio Withdrawn

0.5
0
-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

Standardized Time Segments
Fig. 4: Median volume and open interest ratio over a standardized time period for all cash transactions. The volume and
open interest ratio for each company is calculated by dividing the total daily volume and open interest for the company’s options
by the average daily volume and open interest in the period four to eight weeks prior to the transaction announcement date.
Standardized time segments are obtained by dividing each company’s transaction period into 10 time segments reflecting the 110 time periods, and the median volume and open interest ratios are taken within each period. -1 though -4 time periods reflect
similarly rescaled time segments before the announcement. Data is included where available.

The graph shows a decrease in the median volume ratio for completed cash transactions from the pre-bid
period (-1 to -4 time segments before announcement) of ~1.0 to less than 0.5 (starting 4 time segments
after announcement). In the last two time periods (last fifth of the bid period), 46% of companies
involved in completed all cash transactions show average options volume of less than ¼ of normal
volume, as compared to 23% in withdrawn transactions. Because open interest remains at normal levels
throughout the bid period but options volume decreases, liquidity in completed all cash transactions
appears to decrease over time.
Analyzing the volatility ratios a day after announcement using a two-tailed t-test with unequal variances, I
find no significant difference between successful and failed transactions at a 1% level. Analyzing the
data set for the day before resolution using the same test, I find a statistical difference in volatility ratios
between successful and failed transactions at the 1% level. Some data points drop out due to differences
in the timing of the transactions.
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Table 3: Results from a two-tailed t-test for differences in means between the volatility ratio 𝜎𝑇 /𝜎𝐹 for completed and withdrawn
all cash transactions both one day after announcement and one day before resolution. The volatility ratio is calculated as the
current target implied volatility divided by the fallback implied volatility taken 4 weeks prior to the transaction announcement.

All Cash Transaction IV 1 Day After
Announcement (Call Data)
Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference
P(T<=t) two-tail

Completed
0.791
0.297
325
0
0.75

Withdrawn
0.819
0.227
33

All Cash Transaction IV 1 Day Before
Resolution (Call Data)
Completed
0.671
0.383
324
0
0.00

Withdrawn
1.505
0.976
31

Table 3 shows that the market is initially unable to discern to-be-successful transactions from to-bewithdrawn transactions, but is able to make this differentiation by the resolution date. This result is
consistent with the differences in slope for successful and withdrawn transactions over the standardized
time scale.
Stock Swap Bids:
Stock swap bids using the

𝜎𝑇
𝜎𝐴

ratio in both the days after announcement and days to resolution time frame

are shown in Figures 5 and 6.

3
2.5

Ratio σ(T)/σ(A)

2
1.5
Call Completed

1

Call Withdrawn

0.5

Put Completed

0
-0.5 0

Put Withdrawn
20

40

60

80

100

-1
-1.5

Days After Announcement

Fig. 5: Median volatility ratio 𝜎𝑇 /𝜎𝐴 for calls and puts separated by completed and withdrawn stock swap transactions for
each day after the transaction announcement. The volatility ratio is calculated as the current target implied volatility divided by
the current acquirer implied volatility. Transactions which were resolved within 100 days are included in the data and are
removed for the median calculation the day after they were resolved.
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Fig. 6: Median volatility ratio 𝜎𝑇 /𝜎𝐴 for calls and puts separated by completed and withdrawn stock swap transactions for
each day before resolution. The volatility ratio is calculated as the current target implied volatility divided by the current acquirer
implied volatility. Transactions which were resolved within 100 days are included in the data and are introduced into the sample
the day they were announced.

The Wilcoxon signed rank tests in Table 4 show that the market displays a significant difference in the
median implied volatilities only in the weeks to completion time frame at a 1% level.

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
-1

Median Ratio
Number of Observations
Completed Withdrawn Completed Withdrawn
99.85%
92.83%
45
10
105.48%
100.90%
46
10
104.47%
92.57%
46
10
96.71%
110.59%
46
10
101.01%
110.56%
46
10
104.37%
98.95%
46
10
99.46%
108.73%
46
10
101.68%
111.85%
46
10
97.79%
104.74%
46
9
106.97%
107.94%
44
9
105.96%
97.10%
41
9
131.31%

101.74%

Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
p>0.2

45

Weeks Before Resolution

Weeks After Announcement

Table 4: Median volatility ratio 𝜎𝑇 /𝜎𝐴 for stock swap transactions and number of observations for each week after announcement
(left panel) and each week before resolution (right panel). Wicoxon Signed-Rank Test p-value displayed below. Note: Week 0
refers to the day of announcement.

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Median Ratio
Number of Observations
Completed Withdrawn Completed Withdrawn
100.81%
137.63%
45
10
95.27%
123.12%
46
10
95.32%
104.32%
45
10
105.02%
131.09%
46
10
114.13%
132.15%
45
10
110.35%
118.97%
45
10
104.29%
118.73%
45
10
108.91%
122.75%
45
10
106.72%
122.56%
45
9
104.58%
125.38%
44
9
111.21%
104.31%
41
9

10
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
0.001<p<0.005
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Figure 7 uses the directionally indifferent ratio
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and charts median values across a rescaled time

frame to stretch all transactions to exactly 100 days. I hypothesize that this ratio should approach zero for
successful transactions. This graph shows a sharp spike upwards in the median value for failed
transactions towards the resolution date but no spike for completed transactions.

0.7
Ratio (σ(T)-σ(A))/σ(A)

0.6
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Call Completed

0.3

Call Withdrawn
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Put Completed
Put Withdrawn

0.1
0
0
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80

100

Standardized 100 Day Transaction Period
Figure 7: Median volatility ratio |𝜎𝑇 − 𝜎𝐴 |/𝜎𝐴 for calls and puts separated by completed and withdrawn stock swap
transactions in a standardized 100 day transaction period. The volatility ratio is calculated as the current target implied volatility
minus the current acquirer implied volatility all divided by the current acquirer implied volatility. Each target company’s bid
period is scaled to 100 days and each data point is attributed to the nearest rescaled day. Data is included where available.

Ordinary least squares regression shows a statistically significant slope parameter for the completed
versus withdrawn transactions. Using call data, the parameters are estimated in Table 5.
Table 5: Regression coefficient estimates and p-values for separate call and put stock swap transaction data on a standardized 100
day transaction period. The regression equation is |𝜎𝑇 − 𝜎𝐴 |/𝜎𝐴 = 𝛽1 (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽2 (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗
𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽3 (𝑃𝐸) + 𝐶 where 𝜎𝑇 is the target’s implied volatility on a particular day, 𝜎𝐴 is the acquirer’s implied volatility,
time to resolution is the days after announcement in the standardized 100 day transaction period, and failure and PE (private
equity) are indicator variables for those scenarios.

Call Data

Put Data

Description

Estimate

P-value

Estimate

P-value

C

Intercept

0.29359

<.0001

0.28914

<.0001

β1

Time to Resolution

-0.000446

.0057

-0.000701

<.0001

β2

Time to Resolution * Failure

0.001183

<.0001

0.000669

.0007

β3

Private Equity Participation (Y/N)

0.00929

.6209

-0.0406

0.0223
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The regression along a standardized 100 day time period for stock swap transactions shows very weak
correlation with r-squared values of .0065 and .0051 for call and put data respectively. The slopes for
both completed (𝛽1 ) and failed (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ) transactions are statistically significant. The magnitude is
however not particularly notable, showing essentially a flat slope over the course of the transaction for
both successful and failed transactions when looking at both call and put data.
Furthermore, the results of the two-tailed t-test for means assuming unequal variances for both one day
after announcement and one day before resolution are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Results from a two-tailed t-test for difference in means between the volatility ratio |𝜎𝑇 − 𝜎𝐴 |/𝜎𝐴 for completed and
withdrawn stock swap transactions both one day after announcement and one day before resolution. The volatility ratio is
calculated as the current target implied volatility minus the current acquirer implied volatility all divided by the current acquirer
implied volatility.

Stock Swap Transactions 1 Day After
Announcement (Call Data)
Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference
P(T<=t) two-tail

Completed
0.412
0.797
41
0
0.14

Withdrawn
0.193
0.015
10

Stock Swap Transactions 1 Day
Before Resolution (Call Data)
Completed
0.268
0.055
45
0
0.10

Withdrawn
0.510
0.173
10

The data for one day after announcement shows that the mean ratio is actually higher for completed
transactions than for withdrawn transactions. This is partially a result of large outliers entering into the
mean calculation. The two samples are not statistically significant at the 1% level at either time point.
Decreases in liquidity also exist in the stock transaction data for completed transactions. Figure 8 shows
the median volume and open interest ratios for stock transactions. Like with cash transactions, the
median volume ratio for completed cash transactions goes from ~1.0 in the pre-bid period to ~ 0.5 as the
transaction proceeds. The median open interest does not fall from the pre-bid time segments. Because
open interest remains at normal levels but options volume decreases, liquidity in completed all cash
transactions decreases over time. Furthermore, for withdrawn transactions, the median volume ratio
shows liquidity increasing in the last few time segments.
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Figure 8: Median volume and open interest ratio over a standardized time period for stock swap transactions. The volume
and open interest ratio for each company was calculated by dividing the total daily volume and open interest for the company’s
options by the average daily volume and open interest in the period four to eight weeks prior to the transaction announcement.
Standardized time segments are obtained by dividing each company’s transaction period into 10 time segments reflecting the 110 time periods, and the median volume and open interest ratios are taken within each period. -1 though -4 time periods reflect
similarly rescaled time segments before the announcement. Data is included where available.

In the last two time periods (last fifth of the bid period), 31% of companies involved in completed allstock transactions show average options volume of less than ¼ of normal volume, as compared to 0% in
withdrawn transactions.
Summary and Conclusion:
This study examined the differences in implied volatilities between successful and failed transactions for
cash and stock swap transactions during the bid period. From the analysis, I conclude that the ability of
the market to distinguish between successful and failed transactions is different for all cash and all stock
transactions.
For cash bids, the implied volatilities for successful and failed transactions separated over time. As the
bid period progressed, only the median volatility ratio for failed transactions increased. While initially,
the data showed no statistical significance between samples a day after announcement, the market’s

Implied Volatilities in Mergers and Acquisitions

18

ability to discern differences increased as the target company approached the resolution date. The
regression of the all cash volatility ratio over time exhibited weak correlation, but the statistically
significant slope coefficients showed differences between successful and failed transactions.
The data for stock swap transactions pointed to a different outcome. Nominally small regression
coefficients for the time variable and a weak ability of the market to categorize transactions as successful
or failed on the basis of the constructed ratios were evident at both the day after announcement and the
day before resolution. This may be due in part to the relatively small differences between intrinsic
acquirer and target implied volatilities. The small data set may have reduced the ability to draw
conclusions from the data.
Further complicating the cash and stock swap studies was the existence of stale volatilities, as liquidity
tended to dry up as to-be completed transactions went to resolution for both all stock and all cash
transactions. Conversely, liquidity issues were not observed for withdrawn transactions. These stale
volatilities would likely skew the data to bring the means between completed and failed transactions
closer together. It may be useful in the future to examine how these conclusions extend to mixed
consideration transactions and to analyze within company changes in implied volatilities instead of
addressing the completed and withdrawn samples in aggregate.
With further refinement, these conclusions may lend themselves to being tested in a merger arbitrage
strategy which would utilize implied volatility ratios or changes in the ratios to select potential winners
and losers, particularly for cash bids. Future analysis in the field is needed to identify opportunities in
which to utilize implied volatilities to generate trading strategies among more commonly arbitraged
transactions, as many of the successful transactions in this data set offered very low returns even starting a
few days after the transaction announcement. Such low return transactions are not particularly applicable
to hedge funds as the risk-reward is unattractive and the potential premium is too marginal to capture
even with leverage. Because hedge funds focus on only a few transactions at a given time, a more
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realistic representation of the merger arbitrage universe for hedge funds would likely be found in fund
disclosures, which discuss a reduced set of popular transactions as opposed to the commonly studied data
set of all announced transactions.
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